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Two-Year Evaluation of Mandatory Bundled
Payments for Joint Replacement
Michael L. Barnett, M.D., Andrew Wilcock, Ph.D.,
J. Michael McWilliams, M.D., Ph.D., Arnold M. Epstein, M.D.,
Karen E. Joynt Maddox, M.D., M.P.H., E. John Orav, Ph.D.,
David C. Grabowski, Ph.D., and Ateev Mehrotra, M.D., M.P.H.
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In 2016, Medicare implemented Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR), a
national mandatory bundled-payment model for hip or knee replacement in randomly selected metropolitan statistical areas. Hospitals in such areas receive bonuses
or pay penalties based on Medicare spending per hip- or knee-replacement episode
(defined as the hospitalization plus 90 days after discharge).
METHODS

We conducted difference-in-differences analyses using Medicare claims from 2015
through 2017, encompassing the first 2 years of bundled payments in the CJR program. We evaluated hip- or knee-replacement episodes in 75 metropolitan statistical
areas randomly assigned to mandatory participation in the CJR program (bundledpayment metropolitan statistical areas, hereafter referred to as “treatment” areas) as
compared with those in 121 control areas, before and after implementation of the CJR
model. The primary outcomes were institutional spending per hip- or knee-replacement episode (i.e., Medicare payments to institutions, primarily to hospitals and
post–acute care facilities), rates of postsurgical complications, and the percentage of
“high-risk” patients (i.e., patients for whom there was an elevated risk of spending
— a measure of patient selection). Analyses were adjusted for the hospital and characteristics of the patients and procedures.
RESULTS

From 2015 through 2017, there were 280,161 hip- or knee-replacement procedures in
803 hospitals in treatment areas and 377,278 procedures in 962 hospitals in control
areas. After the initiation of the CJR model, there were greater decreases in institutional spending per joint-replacement episode in treatment areas than in control areas
(differential change [i.e., the between-group difference in the change from the period
before the CJR model], −$812, or a −3.1% differential decrease relative to the treatment-group baseline; P<0.001). The differential reduction was driven largely by a 5.9%
relative decrease in the percentage of episodes in which patients were discharged to
post–acute care facilities. The CJR program did not have a significant differential effect on the composite rate of complications (P = 0.67) or on the percentage of jointreplacement procedures performed in high-risk patients (P = 0.81).
CONCLUSIONS

In the first 2 years of the CJR program, there was a modest reduction in spending per
hip- or knee-replacement episode, without an increase in rates of complications.
(Funded by the Commonwealth Fund and the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health.)
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I

n April 2016, Medicare initiated Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR),
a mandatory bundled-payment model for inpatient replacement of the hip or knee.1 In the
CJR program, hospitals are held accountable for
spending for an episode of care, which includes
the index hospitalization for the procedure plus
all spending (with minor exceptions specified by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services)
in the 90 days after discharge.2 In contrast to the
voluntary nature of other alternative payment
models, CJR randomly assigns metropolitan statistical areas to mandatory participation.3,4 Hospitals in areas that are randomly assigned to the
CJR program are subject to bundled payments
for all episodes of hip or knee replacement.
Like other bundled-payment programs,5,6 CJR
was designed to provide financial incentives for
hospitals to reduce spending without compromising quality across an entire episode of care
during the index hospitalization and after discharge. During a CJR episode, fee-for-service payments are made as usual to all providers (e.g.,
outpatient physicians or skilled nursing facilities).
Participating hospitals then undergo an annual
retrospective reconciliation process in which their
average spending per episode is compared with
a hospital-specific benchmark. Hospitals share
savings with Medicare if spending falls below
the benchmark or, starting in 2017, they pay a
penalty if spending exceeds the target.1,2 As with
the accountable care organization programs in
Medicare,7,8 the savings or losses of hospitals are
adjusted according to their performance in a mix
of hip- or knee-replacement quality measures
such as rates of complications.
Voluntary bundled-payment programs have
been associated with either unchanged or reduced
spending without deterioration in quality.9-11 However, changes observed in these programs could
be due to the selective participation of highly
motivated hospitals and providers.12,13 As compared with previous voluntary programs, CJR is
an important advance because it features both a
randomized design and mandatory participation.
Evaluations of the first year of CJR showed modest although not always significant decreases in
total spending, without changes in quality.14,15 As
CJR matures, it is unclear whether these savings
will become larger and whether negative unintended consequences, such as hospitals declining
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to treat sicker patients whose care could potentially be more costly,12,13 will become evident.
We compared changes in spending and quality
in the first 2 years of the CJR program between
areas that were randomly assigned to the new
bundled-payment model (“treatment” areas) and
control areas. We also evaluated any potentially
unintended consequences such as the selection
of healthier patients for hip or knee replacement
or an increased volume of these procedures.

Me thods
Study Population

We analyzed Medicare claims and enrollment
data from 2015 through 2017 on Medicare feefor-service beneficiaries who underwent inpatient
primary hip- or knee-replacement procedures
(diagnosis-related group [DRG] 469 or DRG 470
at discharge) at hospitals in one of the 196 metropolitan statistical areas that were eligible for
participation in the CJR program (Fig. S1 in the
Supplementary Appendix, available with the full
text of this article at NEJM.org). Revisions of
previous hip- or knee-replacement procedures
were not included in the CJR program. The unit
of analysis was an episode of hip or knee replacement, defined as the period between the date of
admission for hospitalization and 90 days after
discharge.
The CJR program began in April 2016. In our
study, the 12-month period before the initiation of
the CJR model included procedures performed
between January 1 and December 31, 2015, and
the 15-month period after the initiation of the
CJR model included procedures that occurred
between July 1, 2016, and September 30, 2017.
We used data through December 31, 2017, to
cover the 90-day period after hospital discharge
for all hip- or knee-replacement procedures; this
encompassed the period used by CJR to assess
performance in years 1 and 2 of the program. In
the primary analysis, we excluded episodes that
began during a 6-month transition period from
January 1 through June 30, 2016, since during
this time hip- or knee-replacement episodes overlapped into the period after the initiation of the
CJR model or occurred early after initiation of
the program, when hospitals may have been
adjusting to the new payment model.
For each patient who underwent a hip- or
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knee-replacement procedure, including those who
did and those who did not have a hip fracture,
we included the first admission for joint replacement during the 2015–2017 period. We excluded
episodes for patients with active end-stage renal
disease and episodes with any additional hip- or
knee-replacement procedures (e.g., sequential knee
replacements) in the 90 days after discharge
from the index hospitalization. We also excluded
joint-replacement procedures performed in hospitals that participated in the Bundled Payments
for Care Improvement (BPCI) program for hip- or
knee-replacement procedures16 and any episode
of hip or knee replacement in which the patient
was discharged to a skilled nursing facility or
home health agency that participated in the BPCI
program for hip- or knee-replacement procedures.
We applied one additional exclusion criterion
that was not part of the CJR program. To assess
coexisting conditions in the patients and to ensure that we captured all care within the episode, we limited our analyses to patients who
were continuously enrolled in fee-for-service
Medicare Part A and Part B for 12 months before
the hip- or knee-replacement episode through 90
days after discharge or until death. A comparison of the overall Medicare population and the
continuously enrolled population is provided in
Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix.
This study was approved by the institutional
review board at Harvard Medical School. Informed
consent was waived because the data were de
identified.
Study Variables

Randomization

Of 380 metropolitan statistical areas in the
United States, 196 were identified as being eligible for the CJR program on the basis of volume
of hip- or knee-replacement procedures and participation in the BPCI program (Methods section
A in the Supplementary Appendix). Medicare
categorized the 196 eligible areas into strata according to the median population (two strata).
Each population stratum was then differentiated
according to quartile of spending per hip- or
knee-replacement episode before the initiation
of the CJR model (four strata), for a total of eight
strata. Within each stratum, Medicare then randomly assigned areas to treatment or control
groups. The probability that an area would be
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assigned to mandatory participation in the CJR
program was higher among areas with higher
spending before the initiation of the program
than among those with lower spending. To address potential bias from regression to the mean
that would otherwise result from the oversampling within higher-spending strata, areas were
weighted to equalize the probability of assignment to the treatment group within each of the
eight strata (Methods section A in the Supplementary Appendix).
The initial randomization was announced by
Medicare in July 2015,2 but in November 2015,
Medicare cut the number of metropolitan statistical areas that were randomly assigned to the
CJR intervention from 75 to 67, largely because
of updates in hospital participation in the BPCI
program (Methods section A in the Supplementary Appendix). Because these cuts were not random, we conducted an intention-to-treat analysis
based on the initial randomization, in which all
patients who underwent hip or knee replacement
in hospitals in the initially randomly assigned 75
metropolitan statistical areas made up the treatment population and patients in the remaining
121 metropolitan statistical areas made up the
control population.
Patient, Hospital, and Procedure Characteristics

From Medicare enrollment files, we determined
the patients’ age, sex, and race or ethnic group;
the rural or urban categorization of their ZIP
Code of residence17; the original reason for
Medicare enrollment (i.e., disability or age); their
Medicaid enrollment; and the presence of 27
chronic conditions from the Chronic Conditions
Data Warehouse.18 For each joint-replacement
episode, we assessed the type of procedure (hip
or knee replacement and total or partial replacement), the DRG, and whether the patient had a
hip fracture.
Primary Outcomes

Our first primary outcome was institutional
spending, which included Medicare payments to
a hospital (inpatient or outpatient), post–acute
care facility, or hospice, as well as spending on
durable medical equipment (further details are
provided in Methods section B in the Supplementary Appendix). We chose institutional spending as a primary outcome because it makes up
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approximately 85% of all spending on hip- or
knee-replacement episodes, it is the component
of spending in which previous studies of bundled payments for hip or knee replacement have
shown savings,9,19 and data on noninstitutional
spending (payments for physicians and other
providers, ambulance services, and independent
laboratories) were available for only a 20% random sample of Medicare beneficiaries (additional
details are provided in Table S2 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Our second primary outcome was a composite
measure of complications of hip or knee replacement that was developed and used by Medicare
for public reporting.20 In this measure, a complication was defined as any of several medical
complications (e.g., pulmonary embolism) or surgical complications (e.g., joint infection) during
the procedure or within 90 days after the admission date (full details are provided in Methods
section B in the Supplementary Appendix). We
included all patients in this quality measure.
Our third primary outcome was the percentage of patients undergoing hip- or knee-replacement procedures for whom there was at elevated
risk of high overall spending in the joint-replacement episode. In the CJR model, hospitals have
a financial incentive to selectively decline to treat
sicker patients whose care may be more expensive, because the CJR program does not adjust the
benchmark of each hospital for patient factors
other than the presence of a hip fracture.21 We
estimated each patient’s burden of illness for
each episode by estimating a “risk score” that
was based on predicted total spending per episode. Risk scores were estimated with the use of
a linear regression model predicting total spending for each episode fitted with data incorporating patient characteristics from 2013 through
2014 (before the initiation of the CJR model)
(Methods section C in the Supplementary Appendix). Using this model, we assigned each episode
to a quartile-of-risk score and assessed the percentage of hip- or knee-replacement procedures
performed in patients in the highest quartile.
Secondary Outcomes

We examined several secondary outcomes that
are detailed in Methods section B in the Supplementary Appendix. Using claims from a 20%
random sample of beneficiaries, we measured
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total Medicare spending per hip- or knee-replacement episode. Utilization measures included the
use of post–acute care services according to facility type, length of stay in post–acute care facilities, and readmission or visits to an emergency
department within 90 days after discharge. We
also measured mortality at 90 days and complications excluding hip fractures, as used by Medicare for public reporting. We examined differential changes (i.e., the between-group differences
in the change from the period before the CJR
model) in the DRG used for hip- or knee-replacement episodes (469 or 470), the mean risk score,
sociodemographic characteristics, and the presence of chronic coexisting conditions. To assess
the contribution of differential changes in observable patient characteristics to our estimates, we
also evaluated the results of our primary analysis with and without adjustment for characteristics of the patients and episodes.
Statistical Analysis

Our primary analysis involved a difference-indifferences approach. We fit a linear regression
model at the hip- or knee-replacement episode
level with adjustment for characteristics of the
patients and procedures as well as for hospital
and metropolitan statistical area random effects
to control for time-invariant differences between
treatment and control hospitals and areas, as
well as fixed effects for each quarter of our study
period (see Methods section D in the Supplementary Appendix). The key variable in the model
was an interaction between the period after the
initiation of the CJR model and an indicator for
the procedure being performed in a treatment
area; this describes the mean differential change
in the outcome for episodes in treatment areas
relative to those in control areas (i.e., the estimated effect of the CJR program). In a prespecified alternative modeling approach, we used hospital fixed effects with robust variance estimators
at the metropolitan statistical area level (Methods section D in the Supplementary Appendix).
In sensitivity analyses, we examined generalized
linear models with a log link and mean proportional to variance function for continuous outcomes and logistic-regression models for binary
outcomes. Finally, in post hoc analyses, we also
compared outcomes in three 6-month periods
from April through September 2016, October
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Patients in 2015, before Implementation
of the CJR Model.*
Treatment
Group
(N = 102,089)

Control
Group
(N = 143,824)

Mean age (yr)

74.5

74.3

Male sex (%)

35.9

36.0

5.6

5.1

94.4

94.9

16.2

15.0

Total knee replacement

54.2

56.2

Total hip replacement

31.4

30.9

Non-Hispanic white

89.8

90.8

Non-Hispanic black

5.9

5.6

Hispanic

1.1

0.7

Asian

1.0

0.6

Other

2.2

2.2

Age >65 yr

84.2

84.1

Disability

15.7

15.8

Variable

DRG (%)
DRG 469, hip or knee replacement with
major complication or coexisting
condition
DRG 470, hip or knee replacement without
major complication or coexisting
condition
Fracture (%)
Procedure (%)

Race or ethnic group (%)†

Original reason for Medicare enrollment (%)

0.1

0.1

Eligible for Medicaid (%)

End-stage renal disease‡

11.4

10.3

Urban residence (%)§

85.0

82.4

Previous inpatient care (%)

20.4

19.7

Previous post–acute care services (%)

7.7

7.2

Chronic conditions (mean no.)¶

7.1

7.0

n engl j med 380;3
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2016 through March 2017, and April through
September 2017 (Methods section D in the Supplementary Appendix). In addition, we used
publicly released data1 on the net reconciliation
payments made by Medicare to hospitals in the
first 2 years of CJR to estimate the net savings
or loss to Medicare (Methods section E in the
Supplementary Appendix).
There were no significant differences in the
trends between the treatment and control areas
before the initiation of the CJR model for each
outcome in 2015, the “pre-period” used in our
models (Table S3 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Because 2015 is a single year, we also compared
trends before the initiation of the CJR model over
a longer period (2011 through 2015) in a post hoc
analysis (more details are provided in Methods
section F in the Supplementary Appendix).
To adjust for multiple testing, we set the significance level for each of the three primary outcomes at less than 0.0167 (0.05÷3). We provide
95% confidence intervals, without P values, for
exploratory estimates of secondary outcomes,
which were not adjusted for multiple testing.
Our analytic protocol was prespecified and is
available at NEJM.org. The protocol was published before we performed the analyses of data
from the period after the initiation of the CJR
model.22

R e sult s
Study Population

*	Weighted numbers of patients are shown. CJR denotes Comprehensive Care
for Joint Replacement, and DRG diagnosis-related group.
†	Race or ethnic group was determined from the Medicare Master Beneficiary
Summary Files. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding.
‡	Patients with end-stage renal disease were excluded from the payment program. However, some patients initially qualified for Medicare because of endstage renal disease but were no longer classified as having this disease at the
time of the hip or knee replacement.
§	Urban residence, which was determined with the use of the Health Resources
and Services Administration Rural–Urban Commuting Area Codes database
(www.depts.washington.edu/uwruca/index.php), was defined as residence in
a “metropolitan” ZIP Code. Data were missing for 0.16% of episodes that primarily occurred in Puerto Rico.
¶	We assessed patients for the presence of 27 conditions from the Chronic
Conditions Data Warehouse, which uses claims since 1999 to describe the accumulated chronic disease burden in Medicare beneficiaries (a list of conditions is provided in Methods section C in the Supplementary Appendix).
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From 2015 through 2017, a total of 280,161 hip- or
knee-replacement procedures were performed in
803 hospitals in treatment areas and 377,278 procedures were performed in 962 hospitals in control areas (unweighted). In the treatment areas,
7% of the procedures were performed in the
8 areas that were excluded after randomization.
In 2015, before the initiation of the CJR model,
there were differences between patient characteristics in the treatment versus control areas; for
example, 11.4% of the episodes were for Medicaideligible patients in the treatment areas, as compared with 10.3% in the control areas (Table 1).
There were meaningful differences in the characteristics of hospitals and counties in the treatment areas versus control areas in 2015 (Tables
S4 and S5 in the Supplementary Appendix).
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Figure 1. Adjusted Trends in Primary Outcomes,
2015–2017.
Shown are adjusted estimates for each of the three
primary outcomes: institutional spending (Panel A),
the rate of complications of hip or knee replacement
(Panel B), and the percentage of patients undergoing
these procedures who were in the top risk-score quartile (Panel C). All estimates are adjusted for hospital
and metropolitan statistical areas as random effects.
Estimates of institutional spending and complication
rates are also adjusted for characteristics of the patients
and episodes, as described in Methods section D in the
Supplementary Appendix. The percentage of patients
in the highest quartile of risk was not adjusted for
characteristics of the patients and episodes because
these characteristics are used to generate the patient
risk score, which uses coefficients estimated from
2013–2014 data. In Panel A, the inset shows the same
data on an enlarged y axis.
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Institutional spending on hip- or knee-replacement episodes decreased from $25,903 to $23,915
in the treatment group and from $24,596 to
$23,238 in the control group (adjusted differential change between the treatment group and the
control group, −$812; P<0.001), or a 3.1% differential decrease relative to mean spending in
treatment areas before the CJR intervention
(Fig. 1 and Table 2). This decrease in institutional spending grew over the 18-month period
of CJR implementation from a differential change
of −$541 in April through September 2016 (95%
confidence interval [CI], −754 to −328) to −$860
in April through September 2017 (95% CI,
−1,075 to −645) (Table S6 in the Supplementary
Appendix).
The reduction in differential spending was
driven largely by reduced spending at post–acute
care facilities: skilled nursing facilities (adjusted
differential change, −$527; 95% CI, −611 to −443)
and inpatient rehabilitation facilities (adjusted
differential change, −$227; 95% CI, −274 to −180).
In the 20% sample of beneficiaries, total spending for hip- or knee-replacement procedures (including all professional fees in addition to payments to institutions) differentially decreased by
$1,084 (95% CI, −1,409 to −760), or a 3.6% differential reduction (Table 3). On the basis of
Medicare reconciliation payments of $872 per
hip- or knee-replacement episode to hospitals
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*	All estimates were adjusted for hospital and metropolitan statistical area random effects. Estimates of institutional spending and the rate of complications were also adjusted for characteristics of the patients and episodes, as described in Methods section D in the Supplementary Appendix. The outcome of the top quartile of patient risk was not adjusted for characteristics of the patients and episodes because these characteristics were used to generate the patient risk score, which uses coefficients estimated from 2013–2014 data. CI denotes confidence interval.
†	Values for the difference between percentages are percentage points.
‡	A detailed definition of institutional spending is provided in Table S2 in the Supplementary Appendix.
§	According to the Medicare approach, each episode was classified as having no complications or one or more complications within 90 days after discharge following the index hospitalization.

0.81
−0.1 (−0.5 to 0.4)
21.62
23.60
Episodes with top quartile of patient
risk (%)

25.30

−1.70

23.12

−1.50

<0.001

0.67
−0.04 (−0.2 to 0.2)
4.00
4.56

−1,358
23,238
24,596

4.15

−0.57

23,915

4.72

Institutional spending (U.S. dollars)‡

25,903

−1,988

Average
Episode
after CJR
Average
Episode
before CJR
Average
Episode
after CJR
Average
Episode
before CJR

Composite rate of complications
(%)§

Primary Outcome

Treatment Group

Unadjusted
Difference

Control Group

Unadjusted
Difference

−812 (−981 to −644)

Adjusted Differencein-Differences
Estimate (95% CI)†
Table 2. Differential Changes in Primary Outcomes before and after Implementation of the CJR Model.*
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from 2016 through 2017, the average net reduction in total Medicare spending per episode was
$212, or a 0.7% relative decrease (Methods section E in the Supplementary Appendix). There
was no significant differential change in the per
capita volume of hip- or knee-replacement episodes between the treatment areas and control
areas after the CJR intervention (Table S7 in the
Supplementary Appendix).
The CJR program was associated with a
2.5-percentage-point (95% CI, −3.0 to −2.1) differential decrease (or a 5.9% relative decrease) in
the percentage of patients discharged to post–
acute care facilities and a differential reduction
of 1.7 days in the length of stay in post–acute
care facilities among those in any post–acute
care facility (95% CI, −2.0 to −1.4) (Table 3).
Estimates of these outcomes were not substantively different with the use of models with fixed
effects, generalized linear models, or logisticregression models (Table S8 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Quality Outcomes

The CJR program did not have a significant
differential effect on the composite rate of complications (adjusted differential change in the
percentage of episodes associated with a complication, −0.04%; P = 0.67) (Fig. 1 and Table 2). In
sensitivity analyses excluding admissions for hip
fracture, results were similar (adjusted differential change in the percentage of episodes associated with a complication, −0.05%; 95% CI, −0.2
to 0.1) (Table 3). The program had no significant
negative effect on the use of hospitals after discharge (inpatient, emergency department, or observation stay) or on mortality (Table 3).
Risk Selection

There was no significant differential change in
our primary outcome for patient selection, in the
change in the percentage of patients in the top
risk-score quartile (differential change) (Fig. 1
and Table 2), or in the average patient risk
score (Table S9 in the Supplementary Appendix). In treatment areas, there was a differential decrease in the percentage of patients who
originally enrolled in Medicare because of disability (−0.6 percentage points; 95% CI, −1.0 to
−0.2; or relative change of −3.8%) (Table S10 in
the Supplementary Appendix). However, the
estimated effect of the CJR program on spend-
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ing per episode was reduced by only 2.5% after
adjustments for observed characteristics of the
patients before accounting for characteristics
of the episodes (Table S11 in the Supplementary Appendix).

Discussion
We found that through the first 2 years of the
CJR program, the program modestly reduced payments per hip- or knee-replacement episode without any significant change in rates of complications. This decrease in payments grew over an
18-month period, which raises the possibility
that CJR could lead to greater reductions in payments as hospitals adapt to the new payment
model. The 3% reduction in payments was significantly offset by bonuses paid by Medicare to
hospitals with spending below their CJR benchmark, although even after these payments, there
was a small net savings.1,23
Since the CJR program is one of the only
payment models in Medicare implemented as a
mandatory randomized trial, it is an unusual
experiment in payment reform. The mandatory
participation in the CJR program generated considerable controversy, culminating in the Trump
administration transitioning the program to a
partly voluntary model as of March 2018.24 Although the future of mandatory payment models
is uncertain, the CJR program helps address the
question of whether savings seen in previous
evaluations of bundled-payment programs were
attributable to the select nature of the hospitals
that volunteered. Our findings suggest that the
changes observed in voluntary programs may be
echoed in mandatory programs.
Decreased Medicare spending on hip- and
knee-replacement episodes at hospitals in the
CJR program was nearly exclusively related to
reductions in the use of post–acute care services
in skilled nursing facilities and inpatient rehabilitation facilities. This is not surprising, because
post–acute care services are a large and highly
variable fraction of spending in hip- or kneereplacement episodes25,26 and hospitals have strong
financial incentives to reduce the frequency of
post–acute care services. We did not find a
negative effect on the rate of complications, readmissions, or death under the CJR program;
therefore, it appears that hospitals may have
successfully identified patients who are at the
n engl j med 380;3

margin of needing post–acute care services who
could instead be safely discharged home with
home health services. However, our measures of
quality do not include important patient-centered
measures such as functional status, pain, and
overall satisfaction. There may have been a
negative effect on these dimensions of quality
that we did not observe.
Our results are consistent with previous
data showing that savings in bundled-payment
models9,14,15,19,25,27 and other alternative payment
models28,29 have been concentrated in changing
the use of post–acute care services. Post–acute
care services may be the easiest target for hospitals to decrease episode-level spending because
it is often unclear when these services are beneficial or what intensity of post–acute care is most
appropriate.30-32
One concern about current bundled-payment
programs is that they create a financial incentive
to treat healthier patients rather than those who
are sicker and whose care may be more costly.
There has been inconsistent evidence on risk
selection in previous evaluations of voluntary
bundling and the CJR program.9,33 Although we
did not see any substantive changes in our outcome of primary risk selection, in treatment
areas, we found evidence of differential reductions in the percentage of disabled patients undergoing hip- or knee-replacement procedures.
Adjustment for these and other observable characteristics of the patients had a minor effect on
our estimates of savings. However, we could not
examine whether changes in other unobserved
risk factors for high spending after surgery may
have contributed to our results. Close monitoring for risk selection under the CJR program is
warranted.
Our study has several limitations. Our conclusions regarding the effects of bundled payments may not be generalizable beyond hip- or
knee-replacement procedures,34 and our evaluation covers only the first 2 years of the program.
However, because the CJR model transitioned to
a partly voluntary model 3 months after the end
of our study period, our evaluation encompasses
all but 2 months when the model was mandatory.
Our evaluation focused on payments from Medicare and did not assess the overall financial effect on hospitals. Finally, our estimate of savings
may be an underestimate of the true effect of
bundled payments because we included hip- or
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9.1
13.7
2.2
21.6

9.7
13.5
2.1
22.1

11.55

12.74
2.2
2.2

3.81
31.6
38.5
20.62
20.79

4.15
42.2
34.6
22.65
23.44

2.4
2.6

27,950
14,605
1,481
3,898
877
56
1,988
72
831
4,125
107

Treatment Group
Average Episode
after CJR

30,504
14,733
1,514
5,252
1,261
86
2,056
68
792
4,182
141

Average Episode
before CJR

9.2
13.8
2.3
21.8

2.5
2.3

12.76

4.04
41.3
33.0
21.13
21.71

28,836
14,326
1,395
4,587
1,201
113
1,963
63
811
4,017
138

9.5
13.9
2.4
22.2

2.2
2.1

12.47

3.72
33.1
33.9
20.67
21.06

27,193
14,086
1,390
3,787
1,030
76
1,857
69
833
3,975
111

Control Group
Average Episode Average Episode
before CJR
after CJR

0.3
0.1
0.1
0.4

−0.3
−0.2

−0.3

−0.3
−8.2
0.9
−0.5
−0.6

−1,643
−240
−5
−800
−171
−37
−106
6
22
−42
−27

Unadjusted
Difference

−0.6 (−0.9 to −0.2)
0.3 (−0.1 to 0.7)
0.05 (−0.1 to 0.2)
−0.3 (−0.8 to 0.1)

−0.05 (−0.2 to 0.1)
−0.06 (−0.2 to 0.1)

−0.9 (−1.0 to −0.8)

−0.02 (−0.04 to −0.004)
−2.5 (−3.0 to −2.1)
2.5 (2.0 to 2.9)
−1.7 (−2.0 to −1.4)
−2.1 (−2.4 to −1.8)

−1,084 (−1,409 to −760)
−67 (−179 to 44)
−22 (−88 to 45)
−527 (−611 to −443)
−227 (−274 to −180)
9 (−13 to 30)
−4 (−22 to 14)
0 (−8 to 8)
22 (2 to 42)
−37 (−93 to 18)
−5 (−10 to 1)

of

−0.6
0.2
0.1
−0.5

−0.2
−0.4

−1.19

−0.34
−10.6
3.9
−2.03
−2.65

−2,554
−128
−33
−1,354
−384
−30
−68
4
39
−57
−34

Unadjusted
Difference

Adjusted Difference-inDifferences Estimate
(95% CI)†

n e w e ng l a n d j o u r na l

*	Values for the difference between percentages are percentage points. All estimates were adjusted for hospital and metropolitan statistical area random effects as well as for patient
and episode characteristics, as described in Methods section D of the Supplementary Appendix. ED denotes emergency department.
†	The 95% confidence intervals are not adjusted for multiple testing and should be interpreted with caution, since the analyses are exploratory.
‡	Total spending includes both institutional and noninstitutional spending (Table S2 in the Supplementary Appendix), or both Medicare Part A and Part B spending. This spending estimate is
based on a 20% random sample of hip- or knee-replacement episodes because data on spending for professional services were available only for 20% of the sample of Medicare beneficiaries.
§	Spending on outpatient facilities includes payments to hospitals for visits to physician offices and for imaging or laboratory tests provided in facilities attached to or affiliated with a
hospital. It does not include separate payments to physicians for their services.
¶	Post–acute care facilities include all inpatient post–acute care facilities (largely skilled nursing facilities) as well as inpatient rehabilitation facilities and long-term acute care hospitals.
‖	The length of stay was estimated only among patients who used post–acute care services (with or without use of an inpatient rehabilitation facility), and the number of episodes was
estimated only among patients who used a home health agency. Length of stay for post–acute care services was estimated with or without inclusion of inpatient rehabilitation facilities
because these facilities are not paid according to the length of stay.
**	The composite rate of complications (no complications or one or more complications within 90 days after surgery) excludes hip- or knee-replacement episodes due to hip fracture.
This is the approach used by Medicare to estimate this measure for public quality reporting.

Spending (U.S. dollars)
Total spending in 20% of sample‡
For index hospitalization
For other inpatient hospitalization (e.g., readmissions)
For skilled nursing facility
For inpatient rehabilitation facility
For long-term care hospital
For home health agency
For hospice
For outpatient facility§
For professional services in 20% of sample
For durable medical equipment
Utilization of hospital and post–acute care services
Mean length of stay, index hospitalization (days)
Discharge to post–acute care facility (%)¶
Discharge to home health agency (%)
Mean length of stay, post–acute care facility (days)‖
Mean length of stay, post–acute care facility, not
including inpatient rehabilitation facility (days)‖
Home health agency (mean no. of episodes)
Composite of complications and mortality (%)
Medicare-defined complications, not including fractures**
90-Day mortality
Hospital use within 90 days after discharge (%)
Inpatient readmission for any cause
ED visit without admission
Observation stay without admission
Any ED, observation, or inpatient visit

Outcome

Table 3. Differential Changes in Spending and Quality Outcomes before and after Implementation of the CJR Model.*
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knee-replacement episodes performed in eight acute care services, without any major change in
metropolitan statistical areas (accounting for 7% the rate of complications.
of treatment episodes) that were originally randomly assigned to participate in the CJR program
A data sharing statement provided by the authors is available
with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
but then were subsequently excluded.
Supported by grants from the Commonwealth Fund (to Drs.
In conclusion, we found that in the first Wilcock, Epstein, Joynt Maddox, and Mehrotra) and the Na2 years of the CJR program, mandatory bundled- tional Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health
payment models for joint replacement led to (K23 AG058806, to Dr. Barnett; and P01 AG032952, to Dr. McWilliams).
modest decreases in spending per episode. These
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with
decreases were driven by a reduced use of post– the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
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